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Abstract We study the drivers of executive compensation in the listed UK property
sector. The UK provides an excellent opportunity to analyze executive compensation
due to high transparency in the different components of executive compensation. We
show that company size is the most important variable in explaining the level of
executive compensation. We find that absolute and relative share performance
significantly explains long-term compensation, that management style has a distinct
influence on the level of executive compensation, and that using alternative
monitoring mechanisms (institutional shareholders, debtholders, and outside direc-
tors) leads to higher levels of long-term incentives. We find only weak evidence of
pay-performance sensitivity for both cash and long-term compensation. Executive





Recently, the often very extensive executive compensation packages, which were
originally designed to alleviate the agency problem between managers and
shareholders, have attracted intense scrutiny by regulators, the general public, and
academics. This scrutiny is fuelled by recent corporate scandals at companies such as
Ahold and Enron, and by management pay hikes at times of worker lay-offs.
Therefore, more emphasis has been put on the structure of executive compensation
packages.
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e-mail: p.eichholtz@finance.unimaas.nlIn this paper, we present evidence on executive compensation practices in the real
estate sector. However, unlike previous research on executive compensation in the
real estate sector, which has been based on US REITs, we focus on the UK property
market. A REIT-like structure was only implemented in the UK in January 2007, and
thus has not been available until very recently. The lack of a REIT structure implies
that unlike their US counterparts, UK property companies were not obliged to
distribute at least 90% of income. Therefore, we expect agency problems to be more
severe in the UK listed property market than in the US REIT market.
We study a sample of 39 property companies listed in the UK between 1998 and
2003. We use three groups of variables to study the level of executive compensation.
These are economic and accounting measures of performance, governance
mechanisms, and asset-specific characteristics. We find that size is the most
important determinant of executive compensation, and this relation is non-linear.
Absolute and relative share performance significantly explains long-term compen-
sation, management style has a distinct influence on the level of executive
compensation, and using alternative monitoring mechanisms (institutional share-
holders, debtholders, and outside directors) leads to higher levels of long-term
incentives.
Next, we analyze changes in executive compensation, also referred to as pay-
performance sensitivity or pay-performance elasticity. We document that the pay-
performance sensitivity in UK property companies is weak. Executive shareholdings
provide a much stronger link between pay and performance than does executive
compensation.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to perform a detailed comparison
between compensation practices in a non-US property market and the evidence on
executive compensation in the US REIT sector. Furthermore, we elaborate on
previous US-based research by simultaneously studying the influence of three
groups of variables on managerial compensation, using more detailed data for
executive compensation and a broader spectrum of governance mechanisms than
have been used in the past.
The UK is by far the most transparent of all European listed property markets,
with companies publishing an extensive remuneration report in their annual report.
The remuneration reports have been published since disclosure rules in the UK were
expanded, following the Greenbury report in 1995 and the Hampel report in 1998.
They contain extensive information on the composition and magnitude of executive
pay, including details on executive shareholdings and stock options. For this latter
component of compensation, reporting requirements are even more stringent than are
those for US companies, which makes it possible for us to conduct a more in-depth
study of the issue. Finally, the 1998–2003 sample period takes both the boom years
of the late 1990s and the consequent downturn of the stock market into account.
The paper proceeds as follows. “Literature Review” summarizes the empirical
literature on the relation between executive compensation and company perfor-
mance. “Data” discusses our data, “The Level of Executive Compensation”
presents our results for the drivers of executive compensation, while “Changes in
Executive Compensation; The Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS)” provides
evidence on the pay-performance sensitivity in UK property companies. “Summary
and Conclusions” concludes.
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Corporate Finance
Research on the issue of executive compensation is broad and elaborate. The most
influential US-based paper is that of Jensen and Murphy (1990), who study a sample
of 1,049 companies for the period 1974–1986. They find that a $1,000 increase in
shareholder wealth leads to a $3.25 increase in CEO wealth. Executive stock ownership
accounts for most of this pay-performance sensitivity. In their study, the level of
executive pay ismostlydriven bycompany size. Size alsoinfluences the compensation-
performance sensitivity, which is higher for small firms and lower for large firms.
Hall and Liebman (1998) use several different pay-performance measures. Using
different methods might explain the difference in findings: when they divide the sample
in percentiles according to performance, they find that compensation is positively and
significantly related to performance. Moreover, levels of compensation as well as the
pay-performance elasticity increase strongly over the sample period (1980–1994), which
isalmosttotallyduetotheincreaseduseofstocksandstockoptionsinincentiveschemes.
Main et al. (1996) study executive compensation in the UK for the 1981–1989
period. They examine executive stock options and find that performance influences
executive compensation, and that this influence is stronger and more significant than
t h a tf o u n di np r i o rr e s e a r c h .T h e ye x p lain the increased sensitivity by the
effectiveness of executive stock options. Their pay-size relation is consistent with
findings in US-based research. They find that sector performance is not significantly
related to executive compensation.
Core et al. (1999) study the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the
level of executive compensation and link compensation to stock performance. They
find that weak inside governance, which they define by CEO duality and old, busy,
dependent outside directors, leads to additional compensation for the CEO. For
performance, Core et al. (1999) present evidence on a significantly negative relation
between the predictable component of compensation, which follows from board and
ownership structure variables, and stock market performance. This evidence
suggests that board and ownership variables can be a proxy for managerial
entrenchment, i.e., the absence of active monitoring by the board of directors.
Buck et al. (2003) are the first to study how the introduction of long-term
incentive plans (LTIPs) in the UK changes the pay-performance sensitivity. They
find that, while the LTIPs increase average total compensation, the presence of
LTIPs actually leads to lower pay-performance sensitivity. This finding raises doubt
on the effectiveness of LTIPs as a solution to the principal-agent problem.
Conyon et al. (2006) compare executive compensation practices in the USA and
the UK and find that US CEOs have higher pay and much higher incentives, but this
difference narrows over time. Moreover, the authors attribute a portion of US CEOs’
relatively greater pay to the larger amount of risky incentives held.
Real Estate Sector
Research on executive compensation in the real estate sector is limited and
focuses solely on the US REIT market. In one of the first sector-specific studies,
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influence executive compensation. They find that sales have a significantly
positive impact on compensation, but that there is little effect of unexpected profits
on executive pay.
Pennathur and Shelor (2002) study the determinants of executive compensation in
the US REIT industry by using a time frame of eight years (1992–1999). They
examine pay changes rather than pure compensation levels, and find no significant
relation between company performance and executive payments prior to 1997. But
after 1997, the stock return shows a positive influence on executive remuneration.
However, the measure of earnings-per-share is not related to raises in executive
compensation. These authors introduce an industry-specific variable, and find that it
is significantly and positively related to compensation.
Scott et al. (2001) add sector-specific variables of property type to the model.
They show that size is more important than performance in explaining total
compensation, and moreover, that the type of property investment significantly
influences total compensation of REIT executives. Industrial and healthcare REITs
are associated with higher levels of executive compensation.
Because board structure and other governance mechanisms are supposed to
restrict excessive executive compensation, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) hypothesize
that a well-structured governance system should lead to better monitoring and thus to
a more efficient compensation structure. The governance variables they analyse
include board size, the number of outside directors, CEO position in the board, and
average executive age. Using the 1998–2000 period, they find that, contrary to other
research, executive compensation is negatively related to stock performance. With
respect to corporate governance, they find that board composition is an important
determinant of executive compensation: a large board that includes old directors
leads to higher levels of executive compensation, and that also holds for the presence
of outside directors. Outside blockowners have a negative influence on executive
compensation.
Pennathur et al. (2005) concentrate on option compensation packages rather than
cash compensation. For their sample of US REITs, they find that the level of option
awards is positively related to accounting measures of performance, variability of
returns, and growth opportunities, which is in line with evidence from the corporate
finance literature.
Data
Here, we provide an overview of our sample, which we derive from the listed-
property industry in the UK, and of executive compensation practices in that
industry. For that purpose we use three separate sources of data. Our main source is
company proxy statements, which provide a detailed executive remuneration report;
information concerning director’s stockholdings, governance mechanisms, and
specifics about investment strategy; and the property portfolio. Our second source
of data is the GPR Handbook of European listed property companies. The Handbook
covers publicly listed property companies in 15 European countries. It also includes
financial statistics, management information, and information concerning investment
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presents financial information.
We use the GPR universe of listed UK property companies. We select firms only
if they are continuously listed for at least three years during the sample period, and if
their annual reports are available for analysis. These criteria lead to a final sample of
39 companies over 1998–2003, and a total of 217 observations. Appendix A lists the
complete sample.
If we exclude companies that go bankrupt or are delisted during the sample
period, doing so might lead to a survivorship bias. When we analyze the excluded
companies, we see that approximately half were delisted due to mergers and
acquisitions, and the remaining half were excluded due to nonavailability of
information. No firms went bankrupt over the sample period. Therefore, we believe
the impact of survivorship bias is limited.
The first statistics of our data set reveal several interesting observations. For
investment focus, Table 1 indicates that the majority of the companies in the sample
invest in property in the retail and office sector, and that 72% of the companies in the
sample invest in more than one sector. Companies that invest in more than two
different property sectors represent 26% of the sample. International diversification
of UK property companies is rare: only 10% of the companies in the sample invest
more than 25% of the portfolio in countries other than the UK. These findings are
consistent with Boer et al. (2005), who find that European real estate companies
prefer investing locally to investing internationally, and prefer to diversify by sector.
Table 2, Columns 1 through 3 show the percentages of firms that adopt different
incentive plans over time. Initially, bonus plans are the most popular incentive
payment, but executive stock options gain heavily in importance and by 2001, are used
by most companies. Other long-term incentives, such as share appreciation rights
Table 1 Investment focus within the sample
Focus No. of firms % of sample
Sectoral diversification
1 sector 11 28.2
2 sectors 18 46.2
3 sectors 9 23.1










Table 1 presents the investment focus for the sample of UK property companies for 1998–2003. Sectoral
diversification shows the number of property types a company invests in, where we define property type
as office, retail, industry, residential, hotel, healthcare, or other. We define a company as investing
internationally if at least 25% of its portfolio is invested in a foreign market.
Sources: Annual Reports, Global Property Research
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options. Nevertheless, almost half of the companies in the sample use stock-based
compensation as a managerial incentive. We note especially the decreased use of both
bonus and option plans after 2001. This decrease could indicate that the downturn in the
stock market triggered companies to reward executives in alternative ways.
In Table 2, column 4 shows that the level of total compensation initially grows
stronglyduringthesampleperiod,whichismainlydue tothe influenceofstockoptions.
The lower average compensation level in 2002 reflects the downturn of the stock
market, followed by a slight increase in 2003 when the stock market picks up again.
Figure 1 shows the development of the compensation structure over time. The
relative importance of base cash compensation, including benefits and pension
payments, first decreases and then slightly increases over time. The effects of the
downturn in the stock markets become clear in year 2002, when the relative
influence of executive stock options on total compensation decreases. The decrease
in value of stock options is caused not only by depreciating stock prices, but also by
the decreasing number of stock options issued. At the same time, the use of stocks as
a compensation tool increases.
The diminishing popularity of stock options and the increasing importance of stock-
based compensation in compensation schemes are contrasting developments in the
USA, where stock options have gained in relative importance compared to
compensation in shares (Conyon and Murphy 2000).
Table 3 presents the statistics for our main variables. The yearly average of
executive base salary is £203,460 ($328,690).
1 This average is similar to the average
level of base compensation found by Pennathur and Shelor (2002), who document a
value of $332,482 for the US REIT sector in 1999. We find that the value of cash
compensation, including bonus, is £408,810 ($660,436), which is slightly lower than
the $761,595 found by Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) for the year 2000. However, the
value of stock options is £391,840 ($633,021), which is almost equal to findings in
US-based research: Pennathur et al. (2005) find average option awards of $627,120
for the 1997–2000 period. The similarity in levels of executive compensation
Table 2 Incentive plans implemented (1998–2003)
Year Bonus % LTIP % Options % Compensation £1,000
1998 74.0 35.3 65.0 769.5
1999 77.9 41.2 82.4 1013.7
2000 80.3 44.1 89.0 1226.6
2001 88.2 44.1 91.2 1511.1
2002 74.4 47.1 79.5 1340.1
2003 79.4 49.8 79.5 1418.9
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2 provide statistics on the percentage of companies that implement an
incentive plan over time. Bonus represents the variable part of cash compensation, which is annually
determined by the remuneration committee. LTIP is cash payments related to long-term stock plans, and
options represent option plans implemented. Column 4 reflects the sample-average of total compensation
per executive
1 We convert pound-denominated values to US$ using the exchange rate at 01/01/2000, which was
0.619£/$.
410 P.M.A. Eichholtz et al.between the US REIT sector and the UK listed-property sector is in line with
findings by Bruce et al. (2006) for the United States and the UK in general.
Furthermore, the process of globalisation and the homogeneity of the listed property
sector may explain our results.
The level of average bonus payments does not exceed the average level of base
salary, which is consistent with the best-practices recommendations in corporate
governance that have been published by some governments in the past, and more
recently by the EPRA (2004). On the other hand, the average value of stock options
greatly exceeds the value of average base level compensation.
The variables representing financial characteristics of the sample indicate that
average stock return is relatively high (10.88 %) as compared to the FTSE100 index,
which had an average annual return of −2.5% over the 1998–2003 period. The
overall outperformance of the listed-property sector in the UK is not reflected in the
market-to-book ratio, which averages 0.81. This discount contrasts with US REITs,
which on average trade at a premium during our sample period.
For corporate governance, Table 3 shows that in 20% of the property companies
in our sample, the CEO is also chairman of the board. As it is generally perceived
that the dual role of CEO and chairman may result in a conflict of interest, this
number seems high. However, we note that among US REITs, more than half of the


























































Fig. 1 Structure of executive compensation over time (%). Figure 1 illustrates the structure of executive
compensation plans and the relative importance of its elements to total compensation over time. Base
compensation includes base salary, benefits and pension plans. Bonus is the amount of annually
determined cash bonuses. Stocks reflect the sum of stock-based long-term compensation, including share
appreciation rights (SARs). The variable Options includes previously granted stock options, currently
granted options, and profits on exercise
Executive Compensation in UK Property Companies 411The average percentage of total shares held by executives is 2.2%, which is lower
than average CEO stockholdings in US REITs. However, our study investigates the
average for all executives rather than only the CEO. Institutional investors are, on
average, present in less than half of the sampled firms. This finding is counterintuitive,
aswe wouldexpectinstitutionalinvestorstobewellrepresentedinlistedpropertyfirms.
However, traditionally, institutional investors in Europe prefer direct rather than indirect
real estate investments, a trend that has started to change only recently.
The Level of Executive Compensation
To calculate executive compensation, we use the average instead of the total
remuneration of the executive directors, including the CEO. The reason for using
Table 3 Descriptive statistics (1998–2003)
Median Mean SD Min Max
Executive compensation variables
Salary (£1,000) 195.00 203.46 84.40 38.57 434.50
Bonus (£1,000) 86.75 135.54 206.73 0.00 1600.00
Benefits (£1,000) 15.33 17.84 17.92 0.00 160.33
Pensions (£1,000) 23.50 51.97 86.12 0.00 389.00
Stocks (£1,000) 0.00 29.03 77.41 0.00 493.66
Options (£1,000) 145.33 391.84 1076.96 0.00 8791.84
Financial characteristics
Market value (£m) 213.18 569.93 955.54 2.63 6163.05
Shareholder return % 13.38 10.88 2.08 −91.65 116.32
Earnings-per-share (£pence) 11.64 23.05 38.96 0.00 345.01
Market-to-book ratio 0.75 0.81 0.30 0.37 2.35
Leverage ratio 0.44 0.46 0.16 0.00 0.95
Governance variables
CEO=Chair dummy 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Shares hold by executives % 5.63 2.20 4.17 0.00 23.33
Number of outside directors % 44.44 45.64 9.63 0.00 75.00
Institutional Investors dummy 0.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Ownership concentration % 37.25 37.11 15.77 6.26 87.21
Table 3 provides a summary of statistics. Salary, bonus, benefits, and pensions are retrieved directly from
the proxy statements. The value of stock-based compensation includes the value increase of restricted
executive shares and share appreciation rights (SARs). Options are valued using the Black and Scholes
(1973) option pricing formula plus gains made on exercise. We obtain financial characteristics from
Datastream. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding times the stock price at year end.
We measure company performance by continuous shareholder return, which we calculate by using the
formula: ln((pt+divt)/pt−1) where P and div are company share price and dividend, respectively. Earnings-
per-share (EPS) are total earnings divided by the number of shares outstanding. We define the market-to-
book ratio as the market value of the common equity divided by the balance sheet value of the common
equity in the company. We calculate the leverage ratio by dividing total debt by total equity. We collect
data on governance characteristics from annual reports. CEO=Chair is a dummy, set equal to one if the
CEO is chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Shares held by executives is the average number of
shares per executive relative to the number of shares outstanding. Outside directors are non-executive
board members, not necessarily independent. The institutional investor dummy is one if insurance
companies or pension funds are major shareholders. Shares owned by five largest investors reflect total
percentage of shares held by five major shareholders
Sources: Annual Reports, Datastream, Global Property Research
412 P.M.A. Eichholtz et al.average executive compensation instead of only CEO compensation is that it is the
board that collectively acts on behalf of the shareholders. The detailed data for our
sample provides insight into the compensation of all executives individually.
However, because we focus on the average executive compensation of all executives
rather than on just the CEO’s compensation, comparing our results with those in
other studies should be done with caution.
We measure the average level of executive compensation by using two variables.
REMCASH is the sum of base salary, bonus, benefits, and pension payments.
REMLT is the sum of grants of executive share options, compensation in shares and
long-term cash incentives. In REMLTwe value grants of options using the Black and
Scholes (1973) option-pricing formula. We value and revalue all options granted at
the end of each fiscal year, and if options are exercised during the year, we add up
the profits on exercise.
We value stock-based compensation by calculating the yearly increase in the value
of incentive-based executiveshares.During thepastfew years, the practice of granting
options and shares with additional performance requirements has developed. Since
options and share-plans vest in the unforeseeable future, we follow Core et al. (1999)
and assume that firms set performance targets equal to expected performance.
Therefore, we include the full expected value of options and shares.
Economic- and Accounting Measures of Performance
To measure performance, we introduce five variables. We use all variables in a
current and a lagged term to account for the influence of past performance on current
compensation.
First, we calculate the total stock performance (PERF). Second, we repeat the
analysis with the Jensen α, which we calculate against both the FTSE Small Cap Index
and the FTSE Real Estate Index. Earnings per share (EPS) is our third performance
measure. An accounting measure of performance might be able to explain executive
compensation better than could an economic measure of performance, as it is less
affected by exogenous factors (Pennathur and Shelor 2002). Fourth, we include
dividend yield (DIV), and finally, we include the discount/premium at which a
company trades (1-MTB). Ling and Ryngaert (1997) show that REIT stock prices can
differ substantially from their underlying real estate prices (Net Asset Value, NAV).
Closed-end fund studies often interpret this premium/discount as a sign of
management quality (Dimson and Minio 1999). Therefore, we test for the impact of
the discount on managerial compensation. Appendix B presents the correlation matrix
for the independent variables and the dependent variables of executive compensation.
Table 4 presents the results of the full multivariate regression of the elements of
executive compensation on company characteristics. The results are robust for time and
size. “Financial characteristics” shows that absolute stock performance is negatively but
insignificantlyrelatedtothelevelofcashcompensation.Werepeattheanalysisusingthe
Jensen α and obtain similar results.
2 The relation between stock performance and the
level of long-term compensation is significantly positive, which is due to the strong
2 Results for regressions with Jensen α instead of absolute performance are not reported, but are available
from the authors on request.
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Share performance (PERF)t −0.02 (−0.18) 1.42 (4.15)
a
Share performance lagged (PERF)t−1 −0.01 (−0.11) 1.00 (3.01)
a
Earnings per share (EPS)t−1 0.00 (0.80) −0.01 (−1.61)
Dividend yield (DIV)t−1 −0.04 (−2.37)
a −0.06 (−1.19)
Discount to asset value (1−MTB)t 0.19 (1.39) −0.80 (−1.88)
b
Governance characteristics
Ownership concentration (BLOCK)t −0.02 (−0.09) −0.50 (−0.74)
Institutional shareholdings (INSTI)t −0.03 (−0.47) 0.67 (2.89)
a
Number of outside executives (OUTS)t 0.58 (2.62)
a 2.71 (3.89)
a
CEO as chairman (CEOOWN)t −0.10 (−1.04) −1.49 (−4.87)
a
Shares hold by executives (SHRDIR)t 2.39 (2.50)
a 6.10 (2.01)
a




Investment focus (QUALITY)t 0.10 (1.39) 0.46 (2.11)
a
Internationalization (INT)t −0.63 (−4.66)
a −0.98 (−2.28)
a
Office sector (OFFICE)t 0.10 (1.20) 0.05 (0.18)
Industrial sector (INDUS)t −0.21 (−3.02)
a −0.56 (−2.58)
a
Residential sector (RES)t 0.02 (0.16) −0.85 (−2.17)
a
Other sector (OTHER)t −0.37 (−3.42)
a 0.35 (1.03)
Control variables




2 log(CAP2)t −0.06 (−5.86)
a −0.10 (−3.11)
a
Year 1999 (YEAR99) 0.13 (1.32) 0.76 (2.38)
a
Year 2000 (YEAR00) 0.23 (2.29)
a 0.75 (2.38)
a
Year 2001 (YEAR01) 0.31 (3.05)
a 0.67 (2.09)
a
Year 2002 (YEAR02) 0.37 (3.66)
a 0.89 (2.77)
a




2 adj. 0.59 0.64
No. of observations 217 217
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate OLS regression that explains the level of executive
compensation. REMCASH includes base compensation, benefits, pension plans, and cash bonuses.
REMLT includes long-term incentives stocks and options. PERF is the continuous shareholder return. EPS
are earnings divided by the number of shares outstanding. DIV is the dividend per share divided by the
share price. (1-MTB) represents the discount/premium calculated by one minus market value over book
value of assets. BLOCK reflects the total percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. INSTI
is an institutional investor dummy, set to one if institutional investors are among the major shareholders,
and zero otherwise. OUTS is the percentage of non-executives, not necessarily independent, directors on
the board. CEOOWN is a dummy set equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero
otherwise, SHRDIR are shares held by executives and is calculated by the average number of shares per
executive relative to the number of shares outstanding. We calculate LEVERAGE by dividing total debt
by total equity. The QUALITY dummy is one if a company invests in high quality property, which can be
assessed through analysis of the proxy statements of a company, and by explicit managerial statements
with respect to corporate focus on quality. INT defines the company as investing internationally if at least
25% of its portfolio is invested in a foreign market. The SECTOR dummies represent the sector in which a
company invests, with RETAIL as the base dummy. CAP is a company’s market capitalization. CAP
2 is
an interaction term capturing the nonlinear relation between company size and compensation. YEAR is a
control dummy that captures the time effect. White’s( 1980) heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in
parentheses
a Indicates significance at the 5% level or less
b Indicates significance at the 10% level or less
414 P.M.A. Eichholtz et al.sensitivity of the elements of long-term compensation to market movements. Lagged
share performance also shows a significantly positive relation with the level of long-
term compensation. This delayed effect might be due to executives being eager to
exercise their stock options immediately after a successful previous year.
Our findings partially contrast with studies on US REITs: the link between pay
and performance seems to be weaker for REITs as compared to non-REITs.
However, it should be noted that we study more recent time frame than most REIT
compensation studies.
EPS is not significantly related to either cash or long-term compensation. This is
consistent with Pennathur and Shelor (2002), but contrasting expectations that
bonuses are based on accounting measures of performance.
We find that dividend yield is significantly and negatively related to cash
compensation. This finding might indicate that high dividend payouts reduce the free
cash flow problem, which otherwise could lead to exaggerated compensation of
executives. Moreover, companies with high dividend payouts might lack the
opportunity of positive NPV investments, which signals possible lower future
profits to investors and leads to lower current compensation.
Our results show a negative relation between the discount at which property
companies trade andthelevel of long-term compensation. Thissuggeststhatmanagers
of badly performing companies receive lower compensation, which confirms the view
in closed-end fund studies that the discount is a measure of managerial quality.
3
Governance Mechanisms
Our second set of explanatory variables contains governance and board structure
variables. First, we include a variable representing the percentage of shares owned by
executives(SHRDIR).We measure SHRDIR bythe averagepercentageofshares owned
by the executives. The second variable is the relative proportion of outside directors on
the board (OUTS). We define directors as outsiders if they are non-executives, thereby
including board memberswho areappointed by the currentCEO.Thus, outside directors
are not by definition independent. We measure ownership concentration among
shareholders (BLOCK) by calculating the percentage of shares owned by the top five
shareholders. If the CEO of a company is also the chairman of the board, we introduce a
binary dummy (CEOOWN) in the model. We add a dummy for the presence of
institutional investors among shareholders (INSTI). This variable is set equal to one if
institutionalinvestorsarepresentamongshareholders.Ourlastgovernancemechanismis
debtholders, forwhich we usethedebt-to-equity ratio (DEBT) as our proxy. We measure
this ratio by dividing the book value of total debt by common equity.
“Governance characteristics” in Table 4 presents the empirical results for the
effects of governance mechanisms on executive compensation. Large stockholders
do not seem to be efficient in governing executives. This result is contrasting REIT
studies, which document a negative relation between the presence of block holders
and the level of CEO compensation (Ghosh and Sirmans 2005). Because block
ownership formation in REITs is restricted by the 5–50 rule, large shareholders
might be encouraged to intensify monitoring.
3 See for instance Berk and Stanton (2007).
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compensation. This finding could be because institutional investors prefer incentive-
based compensation, which witnessed a huge increase in value during the end of the
1990s. However, Webb et al. (2003) argue that institutional investors are less
efficient in monitoring than is widely assumed.
AsdocompensationstudiesonREITs(GhoshandSirmans2005) and non-real estate
firms (Core et al. 1999), we question the functionality of outside directors as a
monitoring mechanism. We do so because we find that the number of outside directors
is significantly and positively related to both short- and long-term executive
compensation. Furthermore, we find that in a situation in which the CEO is also
chairman of the board, long-term executive compensation is lower than it is when the
tasks of CEO and chairman are separated. This finding is counterintuitive, as the dual
role of the CEO creates the opportunity for abuse of power, which could lead to higher
compensation levels. This relation might indicate that stakeholder monitoring becomes
more intense when the CEO has a dual role, leading to lower compensation levels.
Executive stock ownership is positively related to both cash and long-term
compensation. The positive relation might indicate that executives with large
shareholdings have a strong incentive to boost stock performance, which would not
only lead to higher values of their stockholdings, but simultaneously increase the
value of long-term compensation packages.
We find a significant positive relation between the debt-to-equity ratio and the level
of cash executive compensation. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) suggest that debtholders
act as a monitoring device, such that managers are paid more in current compensation
and less in long-term benefits. However, our results show a positive influence of the
debt-equity ratio on long-term compensation as well. This finding leads to the question
of whether debtholders are in fact an effective substitute monitoring mechanism.
Asset Characteristics
Many studies document a relation between managerial style and the level of
executive compensation (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Although we have no data on
manager-specific characteristics, our data set contains detailed information on the
asset base of the property companies in our sample. We use the data on asset
characteristics as a proxy for managerial style, because the right property and
investment strategy can lead to superior performance (Myer and Webb 2000). Also,
the riskiness of the investment style can have a direct impact on the pay-performance
relation (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999). We relate the investment style of a property
company to the level of cash and long-term compensation, assuming that managers
are financially rewarded for strategies that lead to higher risk-adjusted returns.
We include several variables to account for the investment style of a property
company. First, we introduce an international investment dummy (INT), which we
set equal to one if a company invests internationally, and zero otherwise. To qualify
as international, a company must have invested at least 25% of its portfolio in one or
more foreign countries. Second, we distinguish between different property types,
categorized as office (OFFICE), retail (RETAIL), residential (RES), industrial
(INDUS), and other investments (OTHER). Third, we define an investment focus on
high- or low-quality property by the variable QUALITY. We can assess whether a
416 P.M.A. Eichholtz et al.company invests in high- or low-quality property by analysing the proxy statements
of that company, and by the company's explicit managerial statements corporate
focus on quality. Finally, we control for size and time by introducing market
capitalization (CAP), its interaction term (CAP)
2, and year dummies.
“Asset characteristics” in Table 4 provides the results for the multivariate regression
of the asset-specific variables on the two measures of executive compensation. A
management style that opts for international diversification of investments results in
both lower cash and long-term compensation levels. This finding is consistent with
Eichholtz et al. (2001), who show that property companies with an international
investment style underperform property companies that focus on a single market.
The sector dummies, which are relative to the retail sector, show that investing in
residential andindustrialpropertyleadstolowercompensationlevels,butaninvestment
stylethatfocusesonofficepropertydoesnotleadtosignificantlydifferentcompensation
levels. Our findings support other evidence that residential and industrial real estate
underperform the office and retail sector on a risk-adjusted basis (Lee 2001;M y e ra n d
Webb 2000), which leads to lower compensation levels. Moreover, we hypothesize
that residential and industrial property investments can be regarded as ‘non-
glamourous.’ The retail and office sector are generally more ‘glamourous’ invest-
ments, with key projects that garner a lot of media attention, which leads to more
exposure for the management and the need for high-profile executives.
Finally, property companies with a focus on quality property have higher
managerial rewards. This finding confirms our expectations, because high-quality
real estate is generally regarded as low risk, but well performing (Baum 1994).
On size, the consensus in the corporate finance and real estate studies predicts a
positiveinfluenceofcompanysizeonexecutivecompensation.Therelationbetweensize
(CAP)andcompensationisalsostronglypositiveintheUKlisted-propertysector.Weare
interested to note that this relation is not monotonically positive. When we insert an
interaction term, (CAP)
2, we see a significantly negative coefficient for this variable.
This non-monotonic relation indicates that executive compensation quickly increases in
small companies, but for executives in large companies, the increase is much weaker
and even becomes negative if a company gets too large. A calculation shows us that,
ceteris paribus, REMCASH maximizes at a market capitalization of £1.2bln. ($1.9bln.).
The control dummy for time clearly reflects the upward trend in executive
compensation, as the coefficients for YEAR all show significantly positive signs. We
note that we assume that our regression coefficients are stable over time. Although we
control for time-period differences by including time dummies, we also check that our
results are robust over time. We do so by performing regressions for all years
separately. The coefficients prove to be consistent over the years, indicating that they
are time-robust. Overall, the explanatory power of our models is high, with adjusted
R-squares varying from 0.59 to 0.64 for REMCASH and REMLT, respectively.
In previous research on executive compensation, several authors raise the issue of
endogeneity. Among others, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Ghosh and Sirmans (2005),
and Mishra and Nielsen (2000) show that compensation, performance, and corporate
governance are interrelated, which might lead to biased OLS results. Like Mishra and
Nielsen (2000), we use a 2SLS approach within a simultaneous system of equations,
where stock performance, executive stockholdings and compensation are the endoge-
nous variables. The total system includes three equations and 17 exogenous variables.
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independence, ownership concentration, presence of institutional investors, pay-
related incentives, and control variables. We follow the agency theory, expecting that
a well-structured board, high insider ownership, and the presence of alternative
governance mechanisms enhance performance. On the other hand, CEO duality
leads to entrenchment, which is detrimental to performance.
Incentives through executive compensation might have a positive effect on
performance. Thus, the insider-holding equation includes performance, pay-related
incentives, the governance variables, and control variables. Executives of well-
performing firms are more willing to hold shares of their company. We expect that the
use of long-term compensation packages, especially stock awards, leads to higher
insider holdings. Moreover, an independent board and the presence of alternative
governance mechanisms might lead to stronger alignment of interest through more
insider holdings. Finally, the compensation equation includes performance, insider
holdings, the discount to asset value, variables on the style of the property company, a
selection of governance mechanisms, year dummies, and control variables. We also
use cash compensation and long-term compensation as dependent variables in the
compensation equation. All three equations include firm size and the debt-equity ratio.
We drop at least two exogenous variables from each equation and structure each
equation such that we can exploit the 2SLS method to estimate the system.
Wedonotreporttheresultsofourrobustnesscheckhere,sincewefindthatourresults
on the drivers of cash and long-term compensation are consistent with those reported
above. Governance and asset characteristics are the main explanatory variables of
executive compensation,but performance onlyexplains long-term compensationlevels.
4
For the drivers of performance, we show that all the corporate governance
variables except CEOOWN have a nonsignificant influence on the performance of
property companies in our sample.
For insider holdings, we find that the presence of large stockholders and a high
leverage ratio have a positive impact on the size of insider holdings. This finding
indicates that alternative governance mechanisms increase the alignment of interest
between managers and shareholders.
Changes in Executive Compensation; The Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS)
Most of the studies on executive compensation focus on the relation between executive
pay and company performance. To gain a deeper insight into the pay-performance
relation, we examine the influence of performance on changes in executive payment.
This method follows Jensen and Murphy (1990), Pennathur and Shelor (2002), and
Zhou (2000), who find that a model that measures changes has advantages in
capturing factors that influence the pay-performance relationship over time.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus among studies on the appropriate model
specification. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) prefer
the elasticity specification, but Jensen and Murphy (1990) use the arithmetic
4 Extensive discussion of all results falls outside of the scope of this paper. However, the results are
available from the authors on request.
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and Rosen (1992) documents the differences between all models.
The different model specifications do not yield similar results, but neither the
sensitivity nor the elasticity approach strictly dominates the other. One advantage of the
sensitivity approach is its clear economic interpretation; further, this method enables us
compare the PPS results to executive shareholdings. Because executive shareholdings
are directly related to shareholder wealth and represent the most powerful link between
corporate performance and executive wealth, we use the PPS approach and exploit the
elasticity approach as a robustness check. The model specification for the PPS is
D Compensation ðÞ it ¼ a þ β   D Shareholder   Wealth ðÞ it þ eit ð1Þ
where Δ(Compensation)it is the annual change in cash or long-term compensation,
Δ(Shareholder·Wealth)it is the rate of return realized by shareholder multiplied by the
company market value at t−1, and ɛit represents the error term.For the pay-
performance elasticity (PPE) the model specification is
Dln Compensation ðÞ it ¼ a þ β   Dln Shareholder   Wealth ðÞ it þ eit ð2Þ
where ΔIn(Compensation)it is the annual change in the natural logarithm of cash or
long-term compensation, Δ(InShareholder·Wealth)it is the natural logarithm continu-
ous return including dividends, and ɛit represents the error term.
Table 5 summarizes the results for model 1. “All firms” provides the estimated
PPS for the entire sample. In “Company size”, we control for size by including a
dummy variable for large firms. In “Blockholders”, “Outsiders”, “Debtholders”, and
“Institutional investors”, we examine the influence of different governance
mechanisms on the PPS. We note that although the R-squares seem to be low, they
are comparable to findings in similar studies.
“All firms” in Table 5 shows that for the sensitivity of cash compensation to
shareholder wealth, β equals 0.00004; for every £1,000 increase in shareholder
wealth, the cash compensation paid to the executives increases by £0.04. This value
is comparable to findings by Murphy (1999), who documents cash PPS-figures
ranging from 0.008 for the industry sector to 0.073 for the utility sector during
1990–1996. Zhou (2000) also includes the lagged increase in shareholder wealth in
the model and finds a cash PPS of 0.08 for the Canadian market during 1994–1996,
slightly higher than we find in our sample. The sensitivity between long-term
compensation and shareholder wealth is £0.20 per £1,000, which is higher than the
sensitivity of cash compensation to performance, a finding that is consistent with the
consensus in other studies on PPS. Long-term compensation yields a higher PPS
than cash compensation, because long-term compensation is in the form of options
and stocks, which are more closely linked to stock performance. The total PPS of
executives in the UK property sector is the sum of cash compensation PPS and long-
term compensation PPS: for every £1,000 increase in shareholder wealth, executive
wealth increases £0.24.
We also perform three robustness checks. First, we investigate the PPS over time
and find that the PPS trends upwards over the sample period, indicating that
executives are increasingly paid on the basis of performance. The PPS of cash
compensation is consistently lower than the sensitivity of long-term compensation to
performance, and has negative coefficients during the downturn of the stock market





Δ(Shareholder wealth) 3.59E−05 (0.96) 2.00E−04 (2.02)
b
R
2 adj. 0.005 0.023
Company size
Intercept 22.48 (1.33) 45.83 (1.02)
Size dummy 22.24 (0.96) −9.79 (−0.16)
Δ(Shareholder wealth) 2.39E−04 (1.33) 6.82E−04 (1.44)
Dummy*Δ(Shareholder wealth) −2.12E−04 (−1.16) −5.04E−04 (−1.04)
R




Ownership concentration dummy −5.96 (−0.25) −12.03 (−0.20)
Δ(Shareholder wealth) 3.79E−05 (0.92) 2.57E−05 (0.25)
Dummy*Δ(Shareholder wealth) −9.65E−06 (−0.09) 1.12E−03 (4.28)
b
R
2 adj. 0.006 0.116
Outsiders
Intercept 22.40 (1.29) 15.82 (0.35)
Outsider dummy 20.17 (0.86) 39.88 (0.65)
Δ(Shareholder wealth) −1.26E−05 (−0.18) 5.90E−04 (3.21)
b
Dummy*Δ(Shareholder wealth) 6.91E−05 (0.83) 5.42E−04 (2.49)
b
R




Debt dummy −11.65 (−0.50) 21.96 (0.35)
Δ(Shareholder wealth) −2.03E−05 (−0.39) 1.99E−04 (1.43)
Dummy*Δ(Shareholder wealth) 1.18E−04 (1.57) −1.44E−06 (−0.01)
R




Insitutional investor dummy 6.17 (0.09) 7.91 (0.12)
Δ(Shareholder wealth) 1.89E−04 (1.39) 1.70E−04 (1.29)
Dummy*Δ(Shareholder wealth) 1.13E−04 (0.54) 7.12E−05 (0.35)
R
2 adj. 0.007 0.007
“All firms” in Table 5 presents the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the sample. The first part of the
PPS is the result of regressions between the increase in shareholder wealth, Δ(Shareholder wealth), and
the increase in cash compensation, Δ(REMCASH). We calculate the increase in shareholder wealth by
multiplying the return to shareholders at time t by the market value at time t−1. The increase in cash
compensation equals the sum of increases in base salary, benefits, pension plans, and bonuses,
respectively. The second part of the PPS equals the sensitivity between the increase in long-term
compensation Δ(REMLT) and the increase in shareholder wealth, where Δ(REMLT) is the sum of annual
increase in the value of stock and option plans. In “Company size” we introduce a dummy, LARGE, and
an interaction term, LARGE* Δ(Shareholder wealth), to capture the effect of size on the PPS. The dummy
is set to one for companies with a market capitalization above the median. “Blockholders,”“ Outsiders,”
“Debtholders,” and “Institutional investors” present evidence on the effect of block ownership, outside
directors on the board, debtholders, and institutional stockholders, on the PPS, respectively. We capture
the effects of the governance mechanisms on PPS by introducing dummies in the model. White’s( 1980)
heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses
aIndicates significance at the 5% level or less
bIndicates significance at the 10% level or less
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executives is robust to the volatility of the stock performance.
Second,weuse the elasticityapproach described in model 2. Althoughthe t-statistics
improve slightly—most notably, we document a significant cash compensation-
performance elasticity—the sign of all results is similar to the PPS analysis and the
explanatory power of the models is approximately the same. However, the elasticity
approach does not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of ‘absolute’
incentives, so we do not report further on these results. Here, we discuss only the
results of the pay-performance elasticity analysis.
Third, the comparison between small and large firms in “Company size” indicates
that the PPS is lower in larger firms, although the interaction coefficients lack statistical
significance.Therefore,wesplitthesampleintosmallandlargefirmsandrepeatthePPS
analysis. The (unreported) results confirm that the PPS is stronger in small firms. Our
finding is consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Zhou (2000), both of which
studies find that small, rather than large, companies drive the PPS in the sample. The
inverse relation between size and the PPS may indicate that large firms encounter
problems in bridging the agency gap between managers and owners. On the other
hand, the absolute values of changes in market capitalization of large companies are
usually so large that they ensure significant changes in executive wealth.
“Blockholders”, “Outsiders”, “Debtholders”, and “Institutional investors” present
the results on the influence of different governance mechanisms on the PPS. In
“Governance Mechanisms”, we found no evidence that the presence of large
blockholders was related to the level of executive compensation. However, the PPS
results show that the presence of blockholders increases the long-term PPS and thus
aligns interests of owners and managers of a company. This relation indicates that
blockholders act as an effective monitoring mechanism.
Based on evidence presented in “Governance Mechanisms”, we questioned the
effectiveness of outside directors on the board, because the level of executive
compensation increases with the number of outside directors. However, when we
look at the changes in executive compensation, we find evidence of an increasing
PPS when the number of outside directors on the board increases. An explanation for
this result might be the preference of outside directors for long-term incentives,
which turns out to be an efficient link between pay and performance.
ThepresenceofdebtholdersdoesnotsignificantlyinfluencethePPS.Asarobustness
check, we split the sample into high- and low-leverage firms and find that the cash PPS
is significant for the subsample of highly levered companies, but it is not significant for
the subsample of low-levered companies. This finding is intuitive: debtholders have an
incentive to reduce cash compensation, because it might affect the ability of a company
to service debt. This incentive increases the necessity for debtholders to take over the
monitoring task traditionally performed by shareholders.
Although executive compensation provides a direct way to link executive wealth
to shareholder wealth, our results show that this link is weak at best. On the other
hand, the value of executive stock ownership is perfectly correlated with changes in
shareholder wealth and is therefore often referred to as the most powerful incentive
to align the interest of executives and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990). The
percentage of a firm’s total shares outstanding owned by executives is a direct
estimate of the executives’ sensitivity to performance. In Table 6, we summarize
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governance mechanisms.
Table 6 shows that the average executive stockholding in our sample is 2.26%,
which implies that if the executive holds an average percentage of the firm’s stock,
then for every £1,000 increase in stock value, his wealth from stock ownership
increases by £22.60. Compared to the total PPS from executive compensation that
we documented earlier—that a £1,000 increase in shareholder wealth leads to a
£0.24 increase in executive wealth—this result clearly illustrates the extremely
powerful incentive of executive stockholdings.
Furthermore, Table 6 shows that executive stockholdings are negatively related to
firm size and, with the exception of outside directors,—executive stockholdings are
higher in firms with alternative governance mechanisms in place. This latter finding
indicates that alternative monitoring mechanisms increase the alignment of interest
between managers and stakeholders.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study the drivers of executive compensation in the UK listed-
property sector. The UK market is especially important to study, as the tax-efficient
REIT structure was not available in the UK during our sample period. The lack of
the REIT structure implies that the usual restriction of 90% income distribution does
not hold, which in turn might increase agency conflicts.
The UK is also ideally suited to executive compensation research, since the
publication of remuneration reports in the proxy statements, which contain detailed
Table 6 Executive stockholdings


















Table 6 shows the mean and median executive stockholdings in our sample. First, we calculate these
values for the full sample. Second, we distinguish between executive shareholdings in small and large
companies by creating two subsamples, companies under and above the median market capitalization. We
apply the same procedure using ownership concentration, the number of outside directors, leverage ratio,
and institutional investors as the sorting variables
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and full insight into compensation practices. Using three sets of variables (economic
and accounting performance, governance mechanisms, and asset characteristics) we
study both the level and changes in executive compensation.
Our main conclusions are fivefold. First, consistent with previous research on US
REITs (Ghosh and Sirmans 2005), we find that company size is the most important
variable in explaining the level of executive compensation. However, we find that the
relation between company size and compensation is nonlinear. This observation
indicates that executive compensation quickly increases in small companies, but for
executivesinlargecompanies,theincreaseismuchweakerand may eventurnnegative.
Second, both absolute and relative measures of performance can explain the level
of long-term executive compensation, but these measures are not related to cash
compensation. These findings contrast US REIT research, which shows mixed
results for the relation between compensation and performance.
Third,wedocumentresultsfortheinfluenceofgovernancemechanismsonexecutive
compensation. We find evidence that institutional investors, debtholders, and outside
directors prefer long-term incentives. This preference leads to higher long-term
compensation levels when there is a bull market, but also to a stronger link between
pay and performance. CEO duality does not lead to increased entrenchment, which
contrasts with findings for US REITs. This difference might be explained by the
unrestricted legal environment in which UK property companies operate, as opposed to
the US REITs. The stringent rules that apply to REITs have resulted in highly complex
organizational structures, which might in turn lead to the entrenchment of senior
management (Ghosh and Sirmans 2005). On the other hand, the restrictions on block
ownership that apply to REITs seem to lead to increased investor scrutiny, as block
ownership negatively influences compensation levels in REITs (Ghosh and Sirmans
2005). This finding contrasts with the nonsignificant relationship between block
ownership and compensation levels that we document for UK property companies.
Fourth, we introduce asset-specific variables into our model as our proxy for
managerial style. We find that geographical diversification leads to lower levels of
executive payment, but investing in high-quality property is positively related to
compensation. Executives of companies investing in the ‘glamorous’ retail and
office property earn more than do their colleagues investing in ‘non-glamour’
industrial and residential property. This finding can be partly explained by the risk-
adjusted performance of the respective sectors.
Fifth, we present evidence on the changes in executive compensation by adopting the
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) approach. To our knowledge, this approach has not
beenusedbeforeinrealestatestudiesonexecutivecompensation.Weshowthata£1,000
increase in shareholder wealth leads to an average £0.24 increase in executive wealth for
our sample of companies. The pay-performance sensitivity is stronger and more
significant for smaller firms, a finding that is consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990)
a n dZ h o u( 2000). Although executive compensation provides a direct link between
shareholder wealth and executive wealth, we find that executive shareholdings provide
a much more powerful incentive for executives to create shareholder wealth.
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Appendix A
Table 7 Sample overview
Company name Years in sample
A&J Mucklow Group 1998–2003
Benchmark Group 1998–2003
British Land Company 1998–2003
Brixton Plc 1998–2003
Canary Wharf Group 1999–2003









Great Portland Estates 1998–2003




International Real Estate 1998–2002
Land Securities 1998–2003
Liberty International 1998–2003
London & Associated Properties 1998–2003
London Merchant Securities 1998–2003











St. Modwen Properties 1998–2003
Town Centre Securities 2000–2003
Warner Estate 1999–2003
Workspace Group 1998–2003
Appendix A presents our sample of 39 UK property companies, created from the UK universe and
provided by Global Property Research for the 1998–2003 period. We include companies in the final
sample if (a) they were listed on a continuous basis for at least 3 years during the sample period, and (b) if
necessary data was available. The excluded companies are: Ashtenne Holdings, Bourne End Properties,
Bradford Properties Trust, Burford Holdings, Capital Shopping Centre, Chorion, Delancey, Estates &
General, Frogmore, Moorfield Group, Mountview Estates, Peel Holdings, Smith Estates, Stockbourne,
The Unite Group, Tops Estates, Warnford Investments, and Wates City of London
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